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A BIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF MORAL 
SYSTEMS 
by Richard D. Alexander 
Abstract. Moral systems are described as systems of indirect reci- 
procity, existing because of histories of conflicts of interest and 
arising as outcomes of the complexity of social interactions in 
groups of long-lived individuals with varying conflicts and conflu- 
ences of interest and indefinitely iterated social interactions. Al- 
though morality is commonly defined as involving justice for all 
people, or consistency in the social treatment of all humans, it may 
have arisen for immoral reasons, as a force leading to cohesiveness 
within human groups but specifically excluding and directed 
against other human groups with different interests. 
A moral system is essentially a society with rules. Rules are agreements 
about what is permitted and what is not, about what rewards and 
punishments are likely for specific acts, about what is right and wrong. 
The definition of rules can be variously expanded or restricted. If it is 
used so as to include only consciously understood, deliberately applied 
rules, then moral systems may be uniquely human. This may also be the 
case if certain kinds of unconscious or  nonconscious elements are 
allowed into the definition. I will leave this problem for now, only 
noting that it is my intent here to concentrate on moral systems as they 
are known or discussed with respect to humans. 
Aside from its reference to values, the concept of morality implies 
altruism or  self-sacrifice. Not all moral acts call for self-sacrifice, how- 
ever, and not all self-serving acts, by any means, would be termed 
immoral. On the other hand, I suspect most would agree that a moral 
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life will inevitably call for some acts with net cost to the actor. Similarly, 
many acts with a net value to the actor would be judged immoral 
because alternative courses of action of value to others are available at 
the time but are not taken. Generally speaking, then, immoral is a label 
w e  apply to certain kinds of acts by which we  help ourselves or hurt 
others, while acts that hurt ourselves or help others are more likely to 
be judged moral than immoral. As virtually endless arguments in the 
philosophical literature attest, it is not easy to be more precise in 
defining morality per se. 
Agreement seems to be universal (and consistent with the above 
remarks) that moral (and ethical) questions and problems arise because 
of conflicts of interest; I have never found an author who disagrees. If 
there were no conflicts of interest among people and societies it is 
difficult to see how concepts of right and wrong, ethics and morality, 
and selfishness and altruism could ever have arisen. Probably, society 
would have remained simple in structure, and nothing like humans 
would ever have evolved. 
Few people would deny that most or all humans tend to behave 
selfishly on occasion-indeed, in ways that would almost universally be 
termed immoral. This being true, it is difficult to apply the adjectives 
moral and immoral to human individuals let alone whole societies 
(hence, the moral philosophers’ problem of “duality” in human na- 
ture); rather, these terms seem most appropriately applied to individ- 
ual acts. Moreover, there is the complication that morality within 
groups (patriotism, loyalty, group effort) often, at least, correlates with 
opposite kinds of behavior to members of other groups, thus raising 
the question whether cooperation-to-compete has been the historical 
function of group unity. If it has, then we are faced with the possibility 
that morality was invented or instituted (and maintained and elaborated) 
for reasons that in a modern or intellectually consistent discussion 
would necessarily be seen as immoral. This is true unless the members 
of other groups can successfully be judged subhuman or non- 
human-a telling point in view of depictions of enemies during war- 
time and the widespread tendency of peoples to call themselves by 
names meaning human or the people. 
The general idea of morality as serving others, or at least taking 
account of their interests rather than concentrating wholly on one’s 
own, seems to be responsible for the generation of models of idealized 
moral conditions, or societies within which all people treat the interests 
of all people as equal in importance. These models, which prevail in 
the modern literature of moral philosophy, represent hypothetical 
societies in which conflicts of interest have been erased or supplanted 
by a concern for the welfare of all people in the society or  for (in the 
utilitarian concept) the “greatest good to the greatest number.” Pre- 
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sumably, the culmination of putting such a model into practice-or the 
true ideal of morality-would be a world in which all people everywhere 
viewed as equally important the interests of all people everywhere. 
Probably, nearly everyone would accept the improbability of achiev- 
ing an idealized morality involving universal indiscriminate altruism. 
On the other hand, many people might support the idea of striving to 
realize an idealized morality while accepting its improbability. Many 
would regard it as immoral deliberately to abandon such a goal. 
The paradoxes inherent in these propositions have preoccupied 
philosophers and, indeed, people in all walks of life throughout his- 
tory. In some sense they are the most important questions humans can 
ponder, if for no other reason than that we tend to draw into the moral 
and ethical realm every social problem that assumes increasing 
significance-notably the international arms race, exploitation and 
pollution of environments, medical uses of technology, population 
growth, racism, sexism, pornography, drug use, and many others. All 
together such issues account for virtually all major news stories, attest- 
ing to the centrality of conflicts of interest in our lives. 
The difficulties in understanding the network of paradoxes that 
seems to make up the structure of moral and ethical propositions and 
practices, and the apparent incompatibility of morality as self-sacrifice 
with a history of evolution by natural selection, have caused even 
biologist-philosophers to base their conclusions, or appeal to readers, 
on grounds other than biological information and arguments, or to 
declare that trends toward morality are contrary to evolution and that 
biological knowledge cannot explain moral behavior (e.g., Huxley 
1898; Lack 1954; Dobzhansky 1967). 
I think that evolutionary subtheories in biology developed in the past 
twenty-six years (Fisher 1958; Williams 1957, 1966a, 1966b; Hamilton 
1964; Trivers 1971, 1974; Alexander 1979) place us in a new situation, 
in which we can start to resolve the age-old paradoxes surrounding the 
concepts of morality and ethics and in which modern views of idealized 
moralities can be accounted for. What follows here is an effort to show 
that morality need not be contrary to natural selection or inconsistent with it but 
that, at least as practiced and perhaps also as imagined by most, it may instead be 
a logical outgrowth or extension of the practice of social reciprocity by a complexly 
social organism which changes as a result of both genetic evolution and cumu- 
lative social learning.’ 
INTERESTS 
Leaving aside the question of conscious belief or  personal opinion 
about one’s goals or intentions, there is every reason to accept that 
humans, like other organisms, are so evolved that their “interests” are 
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reproductive. Said differently, the interests of an individual human 
(i.e., the directions of its striving) are expected to be toward ensuring 
the indefinite survival of its genes and their copies, whether these are 
resident in the individual, its descendants, or its collateral relatives. 
In today's novelty-filled environments, human activities may often 
be directed in ways that do not in fact lead to increased success in 
reproduction or the perpetuation of one's own genes. Moreover, 
people aware of their background in evolution may be able to use 
conscious reflection and deliberate decisions to live their lives contrary 
to, or irrespective of, whatever their evolutionary background has 
prepared them to be. Neither of these possibilities, however, affects the 
essential certainty that humans have evolved to maximize survival of 
their genes through reproduction. 
We need not be concerned with the possible argument that interests 
are only definable in terms of what people consciously believe are their 
interests or intentions. Biologists continually investigate the life inter- 
ests of nonhuman organisms while lacking knowledge on this point, 
and nonhuman organisms live out their lives serving their interests 
without knowing in the human sense what those interests are. 
Moreover, it is axiomatic that we are not consciously aware of all that 
motivates us, and that consciousness (hence, at least to some extent 
which parts of our knowledge and attitudes are conscious and which 
parts are not) could not have evolved if it did not serve reproductive 
interests. 
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS 
Recognizing that interests are reproductive provides us with the means 
for understanding and quantifying their conflicts. The first step is 
realizing that, for several well-described and documented reasons, 
selection is usually most effective at low levels in the hierarchy of 
organization of life (Fisher 1958; Williams 1966a; Lewontin 1970; Daw- 
kins 1976,1982; Alexander and Borgia 1978; Alexander 1979; Leigh 
1983). One consequence is that individuals may be expected to behave 
so as to serve their own (genetic, reproductive) interests rather than the 
interests of others or of the whole group whenever the interests of 
others or the group conflict with those of the individual. 
The second step, in recognizing and quantifyingconfficts of interest, 
is to realize that an evolutionary history of genetic individuality, which 
is a consequence of sexual reproduction, ought to yield individuals 
evolved to judge partial overlaps of interest with other individuals 
through, first, proximate mechanisms that correlate with numbers and 
kinds of genealogical links and, second, opportunities to achieve goals 
or deflect threats by cooperative efforts with others. 
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Several facts support the hypothesis that conflicts of interests arise 
out of a history of genetic individuality. First, there are evidently no 
reports of conflict among genetically identical individuals within clones 
among species that have for a long time reproduced asexually; and 
evidence of extraordinary cooperativeness in such cases abounds (cf. 
Alexander, in prep.). Second, altruism appears generally to diminish 
with decreasing degrees of relatedness in sexual species wherever it is 
studied, in humans as well as nonhuman species. Third, in cases in 
which identity or  near-identity of genetic interests is achieved in sexual 
species (without genetic identity per se) cooperation is also dramatic. 
Examples are the two partners in lifetime monogamy and the members 
of the large social insect colonies that are actually nuclear families of 
enormous size (e.g., honeybees, ants, termites). In each case the 
cooperating parties (spouses, or workers and queens) reproduce via 
the same third parties (offspring, or siblings and offspring) to which 
they are more or less equally related genetically and which are usually 
the closest (needy) relatives available to each of them (Hamilton 1964; 
West Eberhard 1975; Alexander in prep.). 
LIFE EFFORT AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
The  recent development of evolutionary subtheories about senes- 
cence, life patterns, reproductive value, and the costs and benefits of 
different kinds of social interactions enables us to begin constructing a 
general theory or picture of the components of human social life, the 
reproductive significance of these components, and how they interre- 
late. 
Figure 1 describes a hypothetical human lifetime in terms of some 
ideas from modern evolutionary biology. The lifetime is postulated to 
be made up of effort, defined as expenditure of calories and taking of 
risks in the interests of reproducing (actually, in the interests of carry- 
ing out the best effort to cause one’s genes to be immortal) (Williams 
1966a).2 
Theoretically, effort can be defined entirely in terms of calories. This 
would require measuring wasted calories, which is probably most dif- 
ficult in cases of premature death as a result of risk-taking. One would 
have to calculate lifetime availabilities of calories and the amount of 
reproduction per lifetime, then subtract the proportion of calories 
already used by the deceased individual to reproduce effectively. To 
my knowledge no one has yet incorporated such difficult calculations 
into a specific use of the concept of effort, but risk must still be taken 
into account in quantifying effort. 
Lifetimes can be divided into somatic effort and reproductive effort. 
Somatic effort is designed (by evolution) to lead to growth, development, 
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and maintenance of the soma, always, presumably, in such ways as to 
maximize effectiveness of later reproductive effort. Somatic effort, 
then, amounts to the accumulation and conversion of resources in the 
interests of reproduction. Somatic effort typifies what is commonly 
termed the juvenile stages, although as maintenance it obviously has to 
occur in adults expecting to reproduce repeatedly or across a long 
period. Juvenile stages evidently evolve solely because, as amassers of 
resources, they raise the peak of reproductive value (achieved at about 
the usual age of first reproduction-see fig. 1) sufficiently to more than 
offset the expenses of mortality and lengthened generation time that 
are inevitably associated with the juvenile stage (cf. Low and Alex- 
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FIG. 1.-A hypothetical human lifetime, showing a plausible distribution of different 
kinds of effort and changes in reproductive value. All early effort is somatic, and somatic 
effort continues until death. Reproductive effort onsets before adulthood, here post- 
ulated in the form of extraparental nepotistic effort (e.g., help, or yielding of resources, 
to siblings). Senescence onsets shortly afterward, when the effect of reproductive effort 
becomes sufficient to reduce residual reproductive value. Mating and parental 
effort onset later, and each of the three forms of reproductive effort are postulated to 
maximize at different times during adult life. 
Rep-oductive effort, unlike somatic effort, lowers residual reproduc- 
tive value, and for this reason its usual age of onset is predicted to 
correspond to the usual age of onset of senescence (defined as increas- 
ing susceptibility to environmental insults) (Williams 1957, 1966a). Re- 
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productive effort includes mating effort (on behalf of gametes), parental 
effort (on behalf of offspring), and extraparental nepotistic effort (on 
behalf of collateral relatives and descendants other than offspring) 
(Low 1978; Alexander and Borgia 1978). Theoretically, senescence can 
be caused to onset from any of these kinds of effort. 
Because of male-female differences in early investment in the zy- 
gote, leading in turn to differences in investment in gametes before 
zygote formation, some acts by one sex (e.g., males) may represent 
mating effort for them (and be judged selfish) while the consequences 
of the acts (e.g., gifts or other resources) may represent (or be con- 
verted to) parental effort by the other sex (the female, in this case). The 
use of such resources by females to contribute to the reproductive value 
of prezygotic eggs, moreover, may be regarded as altruistic, because of 
the eventual usefulness of the resources to the zygote, which of course 
contains genetic materials from the male (Alexander and Borgia 1979). 
In all these cases the involved effort is reproductively (or genetically) 
selfish even if phenotypically costly or altruistic (Hamilton 1964; Alex- 
ander 1974). 
Somatic effort can be further analyzed by dividing it into direct and 
indirect forms (see fig. 2). Direct somatic effort is that engaged in by an 
individual with direct effects upon its own survival or well-being-for 
example, eating, drinking, fleeing a predator, or taking shelter from a 
storm-without help from anyone. Indirect somatic effort is that involv- 
ing assistance from others (efforts to secure resources for relatives 
through such interaction would be termed indirect nepotistic effort). 
Indirect somatic effort thus always involves investments in reciprocity, 
although the nature of such investments may vary considerably, as 
between, say, a nursing infant and its mother as compared to two 
partners in a business venture. It is contended here that investments in 
social reciprocity evolve (or the proximate mechanisms by which they 
are effected evolve) so as to yield returns greater than their expenses, 
that is, they always represent indirect somatic or indirect nepotistic 
effort. Such acts would therefore be judged not altruistic but (when 
indirect somatic effort) both phenotypically and genetically selfish or 
(when indirect nepotistic effort) phenotypically altruistic but genet- 
ically selfish. 
Reciprocity can be direct or indirect, and immediate or delayed. Direct 
reciprocity occurs when an individual’s social contribution or investment 
(positive or negative) is returned (not necessarily in the same currency) 
by the same individual in which the original actor invested. Indirect 
reciprocity I have defined as those cases in which the dividends from 
social investments are likely to come from individuals other than those 
helped (or hurt) by the original actor (Alexander 1977, 1979).3 
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I think these considerations bring us closer to taking the vagueness 
out of the concept of morality and tend to reinforce the theory that, in 
biological terms, the social life of humans is composed of nepotism- 
one-way flows of benefits to relatives in which the return is genetic 
(Hamilton 1964Fand reciprocity-two-way or still more complex 
flows of benefits involving both relatives and nonrelatives (Trivers 
1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). 
EFFECTS 
KIND OF EFFORT PHENOTYPICALLY GENETICALLY 
SOMATIC EFFORT 
DIRECT selfish selfish 
Immediate 
Delayed 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
INDIRECT selfish selfish 
(Involves 








(= Nepotism, s. /at.) 
Mating Effort altruistic 






FIG. 2.-Kinds of effort and their outcomes. Direct somatic effort refers to self-help 
that involves no other persons. Indirect somatic effort involves reciprocity, which may be 
direct or indirect. Returns from direct or indirect reciprocity may be immediate or 
delayed. Reciprocity can be indirect for two different reasons, or in two different ways. 
First, returns (payment) for a social investment (positive or negative) can come from 
someone other than the recipient of the investment, and second, returns can go either to 
the original investor or to a relative or friend of the original investor. 
The essence of moral systems seems to lie in patterns of indirect 
reciprocity (Alexander 1977,1979, in prep.), and so I will now concen- 
trate on describing such patterns and their results, while acknowledg- 
ing and attempting to explain how nepotism and direct reciprocity may 
influence the development and maintenance of indirect reciprocity. 
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Indirect reciprocity is what happens when direct reciprocity occurs 
in the presence of an interested audience. Some of its consequences are 
described in figures 3, 4, and 5. These consequences include the 
concomitant spread of altruism (as genetically valuable social invest- 
ment), rules, and cheating. I am not contending that cost-benefit 
analyses of the kind depicted in figures 3 , 4 ,  and 5 are always carried 
out deliberately o r  consciously but only that they do occur, sometimes 
consciously sometimes not, and that we are evolved to be exceedingly 
accurate and quick at making such analyses. 
INDIRECT RECIPROCITY 
REWARDS (WHY ALTRUISM SPREADS) 
1. A helps B 
2. B helps (or overhelps) A 
3. C, observing, helps 6, expecting that 
4. B will also help (or overhelp) C 
(etc.) 
or 
1. A helps B 
2. 6 does not help A 
3. C, observing, does not help B expecting that, if he does 
4. B will not return the help 
(etc.) 
FIG. 3.-Indirect reciprocity: why altruism spreads. 
I N DI R ECT REC I P ROC1 TY 
PUNISHMENT (WHY RULES SPREAD) 
1. A hurts B 
2. C, observing, punishes A expecting that, if he does not, 
3. A will also hurt C 
or that 
4. someone else, also observing, will hurt C, expecting no cost 
(etc.) 
FIG. 4.--lndirect reciprocity: why cheating spreads. 
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INDIRECT RECIPROCITY 
DECEPTION (WHY CHEATING SPREADS) 
1. A, makes it look as though he helps B 
2. C, helps A,, expecting that A, will also help him 
3. C, observes more keenly and detects A,'s cheating and does not 
4. A,, better at cheating, fools C, 
5. C, detects A,'s cheating (etc.) 
help him (avoids or punishes him) 
either learning or evolution (or both) 
A, + A, ---* A, 
FIG. 5.-Indirect reciprocity: why punishment spreads. 
The long-term existence of complex patterns of indirect reciprocity 
may be seen as favoring the evolution of keen abilities, first, to make 
one's self seem more altruistic than is the case and, second, to influence 
others to be altruistic in such fashions as to be deleterious to themselves 
and beneficial to the moralizer, for example, to lead others to invest too 
much, invest wrongly in the moralizer or his relatives and friends, or 
invest indiscriminately on a larger scale than would otherwise be the 
case. Thus, individuals are expected to parade the ideas of much 
altruism and of indiscriminate altruism as beneficial, so as to encourage 
people in general to engage in increasing amounts of social investment 
whether or  not it is beneficial to their interests. They may be expected 
to locate and exploit avenues of genetic relatedness leading to nepo- 
tistic flows of benefits (e.g., to insinuate themselves deceptively into the 
role of relative or reciprocator so as to receive the benefits therefrom). 
They may also be expected to depress the fitness of competitors by 
identifying them, deceptively or not, as reciprocity cheaters; to inter- 
nalize rules or evolve the ability to acquire a conscience, which I have 
interpreted as the ability to use our own judgment to serve our own 
interests; and to self-deceive and display false sincerity as defenses 
against detection of cheating and attributions of deliberateness in 
cheating (Trivers 1971; Campbell 1975; Alexander 1974, 1977, 1979, 
1982, in prep.). 
MORAL BEHAVIOR AS SELF-BENEFICIAL 
If current views of evolutionary processes are correct, reciprocity will 
flourish when the benefits donated by each partner are relatively 
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inexpensive compared to the returns (Trivers 1971, West Eberhard 
1975). This kind of asymmetry is prevalent under two circumstances: 
the first is when threats or promises extrinsic to the interactants cause 
joint similar efforts to be worth more than the sum of their separate 
contributions, leading to more or less symmetrical cooperation. The 
second is when the contributions of partners in reciprocity are dif- 
ferent, leading to division of labor. The second situation can arise out 
of different abilities or training in different contributors, or from 
differences in their accumulated resources. 
Indirect reciprocity must have arisen out of the search for interac- 
tants and situations by which to maximize returns from asymmetrical, 
hence highly profitable social reciprocity. One consequence of large, 
complex societies in which reciprocity is the principal social cement and 
indirect reciprocity is prevalent is that opportunities for such mutually 
profitable asymmetrical reciprocal interactions are vastly multiplied. 
This situation in turn fosters the appearance of tendencies to engage in 
indiscriminate social investment (or indiscriminate altruism)-willingness 
to risk relatively small expenses in certain kinds of social donations to 
whomever may be needy-because of the prevalence and keenness of 
observation and the use of such acts by others to identify individuals 
appropriate for later reciprocal  interaction^.^ In complex social systems 
with much reciprocity, being judged as attractive for such possibilities 
may become an essential ingredient for success. Similarly, to be judged 
harshly because of failure to deliver small social benefits indiscrimi- 
nately in appropriate situations may lead to formidable disadvantages 
because of either direct penalties or  lost opportunities in subsequent 
reciprocal interactions. 
Figure 6 describes hypothetical social stages through which the 
evolving human species might have passed (many times). These seem 
to lead toward a utilitarian or idealized model of morality in which all 
social investment becomes indiscriminate altruism (but, as argued 
here, have so far invariably fallen short). 
Direct reciprocity must have occurred early in the human line as a 
part of the male-female interaction. Initially it may have functioned as 
mating effort, subsequently as indirect nepotism through effects on 
offspring produced jointly by the pair. Alternatively, direct reciprocity 
may have arisen as a modification of nepotistic altruism. I suggest that 
indirect reciprocity followed quickly from one (or all) of these begin- 
nings, leading to the evolution of ever keener abilities to observe and 
interpret situations with moral overtones. In such a milieu, I would 
argue, a modicum of indiscriminate altruism would arise as social 











FIG. 6.-A speculation about the relative importance of different kinds of social 
interactions in some different kinds of societies. The principal purpose is to show the 
probable origins of indiscriminate altruism, its probable significance in different 
societies, and the changes from existing societies that would be necessary to realize an 
idealized model of morality in which everyone was indiscriminately altruistic. 
General encouragement of indiscriminate altruism and general ac- 
ceptance of its beneficial effects result in a society with high social unity. 
This encouragement and acceptance is expected to occur partly be- 
cause of the likelihood, much of the time, that nearly everyone benefits 
from living in a unified society and partly because individuals gain 
from inducing indiscriminate altruism in others (and from inducing 
degrees of it that are deleterious to those others). I would postulate that 
self-serving indiscriminate social investment-because it was seen as 
net-cost altruism and was interpreted wrongly as part of a real trend 
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toward universal indiscriminate (net-cost) altruism-provided the im- 
petus for the idealized modern model of morality portrayed in fig- 
ure 6. 
It is a crucial part of the argument that indiscriminate altruism seems 
to have been viewed widely not as a beneficial social investment to the 
altruist but as self-sacrificial or net-cost altruism (i.e., as both pheno- 
typically and genetically altruistic). In turn, morality in general was 
viewed as self-sacrificing, and it seemed logical to project the expansibn 
of indiscriminate, self-sacrificial altruism to include most or all social 
interactions-thus providing, perhaps, part of the reason for the 
idealized moral models of many modern thinkers which call for 
utilitarianism based on a self-sacrificing kind of indiscriminate altruism 
(cf. Alexander in prep.). 
The concepts ofjustice as fairness, or equal opportunities for all, and 
of justice and equality as moral must have gained currency during 
human history in relation, first, to the suppression of widespread 
nepotistic favoritism and, second, to the expansion of a base of indis- 
criminate altruism: both changes seem to have occurred as reciprocity, 
rather than nepotism, became the principal social cement of in- 
creasingly large and complex human societies (cf., Alexander 1979). 
These trends must have contributed to the rise of universal indiscrimi- 
nate altruism as an ideal of morality and a rational social objective. I 
find it an easy speculation that the concept of a single just God for all 
people bears a close relationship to the same trend. If followed to its 
logical consequences (a goal evidently not yet achieved), this concept 
disallows ethnocentrism, political and national chauvinism, and other 
forms of cooperation-to-compete that may have characterized the 
course of human history, even perhaps providing its central driving 
force, and that sometimes also characterize the practice of religion. 
It would seem that societies become more close-knit and congenial 
environments as the base of self-serving indiscriminate social invest- 
ment expands to include a higher proportion and a broader diversity 
of social activities. Within small bands of close relatives such invest- 
ment will necessarily be largely nepotistic in its effects. In large 
technological societies this cannot be true; there expansion of indis- 
criminate social investment must be fueled by the complexity and 
effectiveness of indirect reciprocity. Such expansion seems obviously 
more likely to occur when the nature and immediacy of external 
threats favor high levels of cooperativeness, when within-group oppor- 
tunities are expanding so as to yield a broadening base of profitable 
opportunities from both cooperation and division of labor, and when 
accountability for one’s acts (including rewards for evidence of altruis- 
tic tendencies) is high. By the same argument, indiscriminate social 
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investment is expected to diminish in urban or other situations involv- 
ing high geographic mobility, low likelihood of repetitive interactions, 
and other circumstances that, in effect, create societies of strangers 
within which individuals are neither stigmatized for failures to invest 
socially nor rewarded for providing such investments readily. Indis- 
criminate social investment also seems less likely to expand in societies 
with contracting economies (as opposed to expanding economies in 
which everyone seems to be gaining, even if some gain more than 
others), societies in which social mobility is excessively restricted (new 
coalitions will not be sought if they have no function), and societies that 
lack external threats. 
It is a novel aspect of the view of society presented here that it can 
explain in evolutionary terms, first, human morality as practiced, sec- 
ond, society’s view of itself and of morality as seemingly contrary to 
evolutionary history, and, third, the existence of idealized moral mod- 
els that are clearly unlikely in evolutionary or any other terms. It also 
justifies indiscriminate altruism as a model worth pursuing, but with- 
out necessarily calling for the regular existence or practice of genet- 
ically deleterious forms of altruism (or, in modern environments, 
altruism based on proximate responses appropriate to such effects). In 
other words, morality and moral systems, moralizing, self-deceit, con- 
science, and a host of other human traits and tendencies now appear 
explainable on4 in light of our history of evolution by natural selection, 
rather than being paradoxical both in evolutionary terms and to those 
not concerned with biological arguments. The key lies in the argument 
that systems of indirect reciprocity cause some (indeterminate and 
adjustable) amounts of indiscriminate altruism to be reproductively 
favorable to the altruist or to relate to peoples’ proximate feelings and 
attitudes as if this were the case, and that misinterpretation of this 
indiscriminate altruism as costly, rather than as social investment likely 
to be profitable to the investor, has been responsible for a widespread if 
not universal misinterpretation of what it means to be 
WORLD PEACE? 
The most serious moral or conflict-of-interest problem in the world 
today is surely the international arms race. Efforts to resolve it seem to 
reduce to two diametrically opposed alternatives. The first is a kind of 
nasty, unfettered mutual deterrence about which one can scarcely be 
optimistic over the long run (perhaps even the short run, e.g., 
Rothschild 1983). The second is one or another brand of what I call 
universal brotherhood, which scarcely any thoughtful person can see 
as realistic because the models involved call for an uninhibited willing- 
ness to self-sacrifice. The prevalence of this second approach, in con- 
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nection with this most serious of all world problems, seems to me 
sufficient to demonstrate that the idealized indiscriminate altruism I 
have been discussing here is by no means a straw man (e.g., Schelll982; 
Singer 1981).6 
We have not so far been presented with a social model that moves us 
toward a kind of universal brotherhood that is explicitly based on 
individually self-serving behavior or that caters to the usual proximate 
mechanisms of such behavior. The view of moral systems given here 
suggests that, perhaps with a considerable amount of creative imagina- 
tion, such models may be developed. 
I am hypothesizing, then, that part of the key to approaching the 
increasingly urgent human goal of world peace and world harmony 
(conditions heretofore unrealized in the living world, human or other- 
wise) lies in the kind of self-understanding, discussed here, that comes 
from biological knowledge. In 1971 I suggested that arguments or facts 
appealing to selfish motivations, rather than exhortations to serve 
humanity, are most likely to solve the problem of rising population 
levels. This prediction has probably been borne out (Ehrlich and Ehr- 
lich 1979; Alexander in prep.); lowered rates of population growth 
seem to have come about because of such factors as declining econ- 
omies, rigid and sometimes extreme governmental penalties for large 
families, the pill as a route to the good life, and the social stigmatizing of 
large families.’ 
In lieu of universal deep understanding of evolution and its cumula- 
tive effects on human nature (such deep understanding being evi- 
dently a condition not likely to be realized in the foreseeable future), 
the goal of world peace, unfortunately, may also be achievable only-or 
most likely-through routes that also appeal widely to the traits and 
tendencies elaborated through the human history of evolution by 
natural selection. 
NOTES 
1. I do not use the adjective biological in the title of this essay to mean genetic, 
physiological, or hard-wired as it is used almost universally by human-oriented scholars 
outside biology. Biology is the science of life, and I deplore the misleading and erroneous 
dichotomy that opposes “biological” to “cultural”or “learned.” Because of it, every time a 
biologist stands up to speak on human behavior he is saddled with the accusation of 
genetic determinism and expected to speak only about some kind of at least extremely 
rare behavior that cannot be modified adaptively by the varying and somewhat predict- 
able circumstances of life. No evolutionary theory or subtheory worthy of consideration 
excludes environmentally adjustable behaviors. It is a fiction to suppose that evolution by 
natural selection does not produce traits that change predictably and adaptively to meet 
changing circumstances. Epigenesis is universal, phenotypes are universal, and the 
function of epigenesis and of phenotypes is to allow adjustment to local and temporary 
conditions. As one example, the differences among the worker, soldier, and queen castes 
of termites and ants (involving morphology, physiology, behavior, life length, senescence 
pattern, etc.) are determined solely by environmental variations. No one supposes for a 
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moment that this means that the potential and tendency for these variations to occur 
when they do did not evolve. 
2. Theoretically, effort can be defined entirely in terms of calories. This would 
require measuring wasted calories, which is probably most difficult in cases of premature 
death as a result of risk-taking. One would have to calculate lifetime availabilities of 
calories and the amount of reproduction per lifetime, then subtract the proportion of 
calories already used by the deceased individual to reproduce effectively. To my knowl- 
edge no one has yet incorporated such difficult calculations into a specific use of the 
concept of effort, but the concept of risk must still be taken into account. 
3. Trivers (1971) referred to this aspect of sociality as “generalized reciprocity.” For 
reasons unknown to me I missed this designation when I initiated the phrase “indirect 
reciprocity.” I do recall that I avoided the term “generalized reciprocity” explicitly 
because of the way Sahlins (1965) had used it (cf. Alexander 1979). Sahlins typified 
generalized reciprocity as involving one-way flows of benefits in which the expectation of 
return is vague or nonexistent. He included nepotism, citing the case of a mother nursing 
her child, and with respect to nonrelatives seemed to be referring to what we would now 
call genetic or reproductive altruism. Perhaps both terms will survive: indirect reciprocity 
for cases in which the return explicitly comes from someone other than the recipient of 
the original beneficence and generalized reciprocity for social systems in which indirect 
reciprocity has become complex and general. 
4. I do not mean to imply that aid will be given regardless of the likely net cost or 
benefit; indeed, my arguments indicate that this is not likely to happen. The implication 
of “indiscriminate” is rather that the aid will be given, regardless of the identity of the 
individual to whom it is given. Even this is obviously an oversimplification, since it is likely 
that some kinds of aid will be given only to close relatives, some only to relatives and 
friends, some to strangers only if there is evidence of reciprocating ability, some to 
strangers only when friends or associates will know, etc. Nevertheless, I think that we all 
regard it as important to be convinced that there are some kinds of aid-giving that our 
associates will give to any person, regardless of identity or other variables. Many con- 
tributions to charity are of just this sort. 
5. Charles Darwin developed an evolutionary theory of morality different from that 
presented here (and highly sexist!), which is summarized in the following words: “Ulti- 
mately our moral sense or conscience becomes a highly complex sentiment-originating 
in the social instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by 
self-reason, and confirmed by instruction and habit. It must not be forgotten that 
although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual 
man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an increase in the 
number of well-endowed men and advancement in the standard of morality will certainly 
give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. A tribe including many members 
who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, 
courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves 
for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be 
natural selection. At all times throughout the world tribes have supplanted other tribes; 
and as morality is one important element in their success, the standard of morality and 
the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to rise and increase” 
(Darwin 1871, 500). 
This is a group selection model, and not an unreasonable one. Darwin is not entirely 
clear in his arguments, however, as is suggested by his phrases (above) “slight or no 
advantage” and “largely guided by approbation of our fellow-men [and]. . . self- 
interest.. .” He notes that “It is obvious, that the members of the same tribe would 
approve of conduct which appeared to them to be for the general good, and would 
reprobate that which appeared evil. To d o  good unto others-to do unto others as ye 
would they should do unto you-is the foundation-stone of morality. It is, therefore, 
hardly possible to exaggerate the importance during rude times of the love of praise and 
the dread of blame. A man who was not impelled by any deep, instinctive feeling, to 
sacrifice his life for the good of others, yet was roused to such actions by a sense of glory, 
would by his example excite the same wish for glory in other men, and would strengthen 
by exercise the noble feeling of admiration. He might thus do far more good to his tribe 
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than by begetting offspring with a tendency to inherit his own high character” (Darwin 
1871, 500). 
Darwin sometimes gives the impression that he sees the “approbation and disapproba- 
tion” of “fellow-men’’ as a manipulative device that turns what would otherwise be selfish 
acts into expensive ones or altruistic acts into self-interested ones. But he does not ever 
clarify this point and frequently says something that indicates the opposite: “Finally the 
social instincts, which no doubt were acquired by man as by the lower animals for the 
good of the community, will from the first have given to him some wish to aid his fellows, 
some feeling of sympathy, and have compelled him to regard their approbation and 
disapprobation” (Darwin 1871,493). Accordingly, I think we must give authorshipof the 
idea that “heroism” is reproductive to Fisher: “The mere fact that the prosperity of the 
group is at stake makes the sacrifice of individual lives occasionally advantageous, though 
this, I believe, is a minor consideration compared with the enormous advantage confer- 
red by the prestige of the hero upon all his kinsmen” (Fisher 119301 1958,265). Fisher at 
once shows that the group and individual level selection arguments are not entirely 
incompatible (both may be operative), while supporting the latter as of greater impor- 
tance. His theory is, in general, the same as that I am presenting here. 
Huxley states similarly: “So far as it [the ethical process] tends to make any human 
society more efficient in the struggle for existence with the state of nature, or with other 
societies, it works in harmonious contrast with the cosmic process [natural selection]. But 
it is none the less true that, since law and morals are restraints upon the struggle for 
existence between men in society, the ethical process is in opposition to the principle of 
the cosmic process, and tends to the suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in 
that struggle” (Huxley 1898,31). Here and elsewhere Huxley does not make it clear that 
showing moral tendencies is in fart a quality essential for reproductive success when one’s 
environment is a closely knit society of humans. 
Huxley’s understanding, however, is more complete than many who quote him imply. 
Thus, he says that “the practice of that which is ethically best-what we call goodness or 
virtue-involves a course of conduct which, in all respects is opposed to that which leads 
to success in the cosmic struggle for existence”(Hux1ey 1898,81-82). “Let us understand, 
once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic 
process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it” (Huxley 1898,83). But he 
footnotes the first of these quotes as follows: “Of course, strictly speaking, social life, and 
the ethical process in virtue of which it advances toward perfection, are part and parcel of 
the general process of evolution, just as the gregarious habit of innumerable plants and 
animals, which has been of immense advantage to them, is so. A hive of bees is an organic 
polity, a society in which the part played by each member is determined by organic 
Even in these rudimentary forms of society, love and fear come into play, 
and enforce a greater or less renunciation of self-will. To this extent the general cosmic 
process begins to be checked by a rudimentary ethical process, which is, strictly speaking, 
part of the former,just as the ‘governor’in a steam-engine is part of the mechanism of the 
engine.” 
6. It seems possible to me that social changes in some technological societies during 
the past few centuries, in the direction ofegalitarianism with respect toopportunity (e.g., 
universal suffrage, civil rights, affirmative action, and similar phenomena), have actually 
influenced moral philosophy significantly, causing much more attention to what I am 
here calling the idealized model of indiscriminate altruism. 
7. One caveat: It is a virtue of the deliberate pursuit of an idealized model of 
indiscriminate altruism that no one can afford to lag too far behind the behavior of the 
most altruistic or of the majority when most are altruistic. But this virtue, as I am seeing it, 
disappears when such pursuits become mired in we-they exclusions contradictory to the 
model. 
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